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 This paper presents an examination of intrusion detection schemes.  It discusses 
traditional views of intrusion detection, and examines the more novel, but perhaps more 
effective, approach to intrusion detection as modeled on the human immune system.  The 
discussion looks at some of the implications raised by intrusion detection research for 
information security in general. 
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1. Introduction 
 The increasing complexity of modern computing systems makes traditional views of 
information security impractical, if not impossible.  As pointed out in [5] and [8], computing 
environments are dynamic with near constant changes in configurations, software, and usage 
patterns.  This makes completely securing a given system—a difficult theoretical task for static 
systems—unfeasible for the dynamic nature of today’s systems.  This presents the need for a 
more dynamic view of information security, one that recognizes the insufficiency of static 
descriptions of policy and security mechanisms and that proposes a dynamic means of providing 
security which is sufficient [8] for a given system at a given time. 
 One of the primary vulnerabilities of today’s heavily networked systems is the 
susceptibility to intrusion.  An intrusion attempt can be defined as [7]: 
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 The potential possibility or a deliberate unauthorized attempt to: 
· access information, 
· manipulate information, or 
· render a system unreliable or unusable. 
In other words, an intrusion attempt is any threat to the confidentiality, availability, or integrity 
of the information on a given system. 
 In general, the focus of this paper is the mechanisms for detecting such intrusions 
(Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)).  Section 2 gives a brief overview of intrusions and intrusion 
detection schemes.  Section 3 explores the analogy of IDS and information security to the human 
immune system and argues that the dynamic nature of today’s computing environment is better 
suited to this approach than to traditional views of protection.  Section 4 offers a discussion of 
the implications of IDS research, which is followed by a summary and conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2.  Intrusion Detection Schemes 
 While there are numerous ways of categorizing types of intrusions, IDS are typically 
divided into two broad categories of misuse detection schemes and anomaly detection schemes 
[7].  Misuse detection techniques are based on the assumption that, given known patterns of 
attack, it is possible to detect when these patterns (or, more importantly, attacks) are occurring.  
Simple examples of this technique include the noticing of repeated failed login attempts or virus 
scanners, which recognize the “signature” of a virus.  While extremely effective for known 
threats, misuse schemes are virtually useless in detecting novel patterns of attack or unknown 
threats. 
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 Anomaly detection systems assume that there are patterns of normal behavior for a 
system.  This assumption makes detecting intrusions a matter of comparing the behavior in 
question to the normal behavior.  If there is a significant difference, then it is likely that an 
intrusion is occurring or has occurred.  One example of such a system is the data mining of audit 
logs for patterns of events that are likely to occur during normal operation.  If an event, or 
sequence of events, occurs that is not predicted by these rules of normal behavior, then it is 
anomalous and is most likely an intrusion [4].  
 Problems exist for both misuse and anomaly detection systems, especially when only one 
technique is used exclusively.  Many current IDS tend to be monolithic systems with little or no 
provision for the failure or subversion of the IDS itself.  Obviously, misuse detection systems 
require prior knowledge of the general type of intrusion likely to occur, and these techniques fail 
to recognize novel attacks.  Anomaly detection systems, while arguably more powerful, are often 
susceptible to an intruder slowly training the IDS by gradually varying from normal behavior.  
Eventually, the IDS could be taught to accept inappropriate (threatening) behavior as normal.  
However, this does not mean that misuse and anomalous detection schemes are useless.  Indeed, 
when used jointly on a more microscopic, diversified level (as opposed to a single monolithic 
IDS), these two schemes provide a basis for a dynamic, intuitively effective, model for IDS. 
 
3. Computer Immunology 
 One way of viewing intrusion detection is the task of distinguishing “self” from “non-
self.”  The self of a system includes all the legitimate functions, processes, or data accesses of the 
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system, and the non-self is everything else.  This ability to distinguish self is also found in the 
human immune system [2], [3], [5]. 
 As mentioned previously, one of the primary weaknesses of traditional approaches to IDS 
is the use of a single system that monitors only one data source for possible intrusions or, if used 
in conjunction with various intrusion detection techniques, is often easily subverted.  The human 
immune system does not suffer from this particular weakness.  The detectors in the immune 
system are light-weight, diversified, autonomous agents that work separately, yet are 
interconnected, to identify (and ultimately remove) those elements in the body that are not 
recognized as self.  The following two subsections explore some of the research that has been 
undertaken in an attempt to use the model of the immune system as a valid approach to intrusion 
detection. 
 3.1  Autonomous Agents 
 In their report “Active Defense of a Computer System using Autonomous Agents,” 
Crosbie and Spafford propose the use of autonomous agents for intrusion detection [1].  Each of 
these agents would be highly specialized to monitor only certain activities of the system, such as 
writing to a particular file, accessing a particular IP address, or even lower level functions.  No 
one agent is critical to the function of the IDS, just as no one agent has the ability to 
independently declare that an intrusion is occurring.  Rather, each agent monitors its particular 
niche and, upon detecting behavior that is considered suspicious, will send out a signal to the 
other agents in the system.  Having received this signal of suspicion from the first agent, each 
agent will heighten its sensitivity to (or lower its tolerance of) suspicious behavior.  As the 
suspected intrusion continues into the system, encountering more and more agents, the level of 
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suspicion will eventually exceed a pre-determined threshold, and an agent will alert the system 
administrator that an intrusion is occurring. 
 As with all intelligent IDS, the autonomous agent approach requires a significant amount 
of training while each agent learns what to monitor and what suspicious behavior entails.  This 
requires a knowledgeable security officer to determine not only the proper level of reaction by 
the agent, but also which resources need to be protected most.  Crosbie and Spafford envision 
that over time the agents will develop techniques for recognizing newer threats to the system, but 
before the agents are released, they must be trained concerning the policies and potential 
vulnerabilities for the given computing environment.  Thus, the use of autonomous agents 
involves both misuse and anomaly detection techniques. 
 3.2  Distinguishing Self 
 While there are a wide range of characteristics the human immune system could have 
examined to detect an intruder in the body, the immune system uses numerous detector cells (T-
cells) which, based on the protein sequences of the intruder, bind with that intruder and eliminate 
it*. One of the difficulties of this method is that the intruder and the host body are both composed 
of similar proteins, so the detector cells must be able to distinguish self from non-self.  This is 
similar to the difficulty of detecting an intrusion in a computer system.  The processes of the 
intruder are similar in nature to the legitimate host processes.  The T-cell concept can be applied 
to the computing environment by the generation of detectors (somewhat similar to autonomous 
agents) which monitor the system calls made by various processes and are able to distinguish a 
legitimate process (self) from an illegal one (non-self).  Researchers at the University of New 
                                                        
* For a more detailed discussion of the immune system in general and how this relates to computer systems see[2, 5]. 
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Mexico [3] found that processes (such as sendmail, lpr, etc.) produce distinct sequences of calls 
to the system.  The detectors monitor these calls, and if they vary from the known normal calls of 
the process, then an intrusion is occurring.  Additionally, it was found that a window of only 6 
system calls was sufficient to distinguish self from non-self.  This concept is not just limited to 
operating system calls. Stillerman, Morceau, and Stillman have had some success in using 
detectors in distributed applications as well [6]. 
 Some of the advantages of this view of intrusion detection are that it is highly 
distributable and that individual versions of software or system configurations can generate 
unique sets of detectors.  So, while an intruder could possibly subvert an individual detector, the 
intruder would not necessarily gain access to the entire host and would most certainly be 
prevented from unwarranted access to an entire network.  Due to the computational costs of 
protecting every process in the system, this view of IDS will necessarily be less comprehensive 
than the more traditional schemes, but it also prevents an intruder from running rampant 
throughout a system.  This concept of intrusion detection, taken a step further, would allow the 
detectors not only to notice an intrusion, but also to stop the intrusion either by severing the 
given connection or by isolating (and perhaps terminating) the compromised program or process 
until the system administrator can be notified of the intrusion. 
 
4.  Discussion 
 The analogy of intrusion detection as an immune system allows for a fairly radical shift 
in the way security is viewed.  The immune system is necessarily dynamic, as it must be resistant 
to both the old and new intruders it faces.  While each person’s immune system is similar, no one 
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person’s set of detectors is exactly the same as another’s.  This enables a given intruder to be 
thwarted more easily.  The direct implication to a networked computing environment is easy to 
see.  If each host in a given network contains a different set of detectors protecting it, then 
intrusion into one host will most likely be limited to that host.  Or, on a lower level, penetration 
of one process on a system will be stopped at that process. Since the detection mechanisms are 
small and numerous, the subversion of one agent does not necessarily imply the compromise of 
the entire IDS.  This could allow for cheap renewal of the IDS, and this makes protecting against 
novel threats more easily accomplished. 
 Ostensibly this has been a discussion about intrusion detection systems.  However, IDS 
research raises some interesting implications for information security policy.  In some ways, the 
challenge of developing a viable intrusion detection system is the same challenge of information 
security in general: How can an IDS be designed to accurately distinguish legitimate behavior 
from an intrusion?  How can an IDS be designed to recognize known and unknown threats?  
Like all mechanisms in a computing environment, policy plays a large role for a given IDS.  The 
security policies for a given system will directly determine what is considered anomalous and 
what behavior is within normal bounds. Policy also points to areas of known weakness and 
expects those areas to be protected. 
 Vaughn proposes a cyclical process to providing sufficient information security for a 
given computing environment at a given time [8].  This process is considered continuous and 
must provide security that is flexible enough to change as threats to the system change.  IDS can 
play a key role in this flexibility.  In general, IDS (particularly those with some amount of 
anomaly detection) can help to identify weaknesses in the system.  Awareness of these 
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weaknesses can then be used during the process of updating the information security policies and 
procedures for the environment in question.  So, there can be a certain amount of mutual 
dependency between an IDS and the policies of the system to be protected. Naturally, IDS is 
only one mechanism that can provide appropriate feedback for the periodic updates of security 
policies.  However, IDS can potentially provide a great deal of guidance in the fine-tuning of 
policy. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 Both misuse and anomaly detection schemes are valuable for detecting specific intrusions 
into a given system, but are not necessarily dynamically suited for today’s detection needs. 
Misuse detection techniques are ideal for recognizing and preventing known threats; however, 
this is not helpful when faced with an unknown or new threat to the system. Anomaly detection 
systems, by creating a signature for normal behavior and recognizing abnormal behavior as an 
intrusion, are more dynamic, but these systems can be trained to recognize abnormal behavior as 
normal with time. Therefore, an IDS that can function using both misuse detection and anomaly 
detection would be ideal.  
 Combining elements of both detection techniques would create an IDS that can not only 
recognize abnormal behavior, but that can learn from this behavior to prevent intrusion. This 
system would begin with the anomaly detection system by targeting deviations from normal 
behavior and recording these deviations. Then the misuse detection system would be able to 
recognize the signatures of the deviations as they occur, and, after a set number of deviations 
have been made, would signal that an intrusion was occurring.   
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 Similar to the human immune system, this dynamic IDS would be able to recognize 
threats to any part of the system and learn from these threats to make future recognition more 
expedient. By partitioning the different processes of the operating system or network with each 
process or application having its own intrusion detection agent or detector “cell,” the entire 
system would be alerted when a deviation from normal behavior occurred in any area of the 
system. Therefore, the IDS would heighten its sensitivity throughout to protect the computing 
environment as a whole.  In other words, by protecting the individual parts of the system, the 
whole system is, in turn, protected. As intrusions occur, the system would learn to recognize 
them, creating a more efficient intrusion detection and (hopefully) prevention system. In all, this 
IDS would be capable of dynamically detecting intrusion while creating reliable predictions of 
threatening behavior.   
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